April 24, 2013

Journalisten: North Korean Voices

This article was originally published by Kathrine Geard at Journalisten on April 12, 2013.

Initiating a media platform for the exile community, and calling for Norwegian journalists with experience and interest in the regime.

North Korea's war rhetoric has placed the country on the global news map. Betsy Kawamura hopes this can lead to more attention surrounding North Korean refugees as well. She has been engaged in the refugees’ situation for more than ten years. A long-term goal involves building a media and journalism program to strengthen the exile community’s voice in Europe.

This Japanese–American human rights activist has periodically lived in Norway since 1986. She is currently planning a fall/winter seminar at the ”Literature House” in Oslo in order to illuminate the contributing role of the media to changes affecting North Korea and the global exile community.

“We also want to find out if the engagement from international journalists has resulted in improvements when it comes to human rights, the media situation, and international connections,” explains Kawamura.

Need for more awareness 

The seminar has received support from “Fritt Ord” (in English “Free Speech”, a Norwegian foundation, established to secure the freedom of speech and publication). Journalists and photographers who have worked inside North Korea, or documented the lives of defectors, will participate in the seminar.

Some of the preliminary names on the list include the German photojournalist Katharine Hesse, who has worked with North Korean refugees in China, and filmmaker Paul Harraby, who made the documentary “Under a Different Sky” for Panos Pictures. The documentary is about a North Korean refugee woman living in Britain. Thomas Van Houtryve, who last year released the award-winning book “Behind the Curtains of 21st Century Communism” (agency VII), and Norway-based Morten Hvaal, who has had opportunities to document natural disasters inside the country, are also hoped to participate in the seminar.

“Other journalists or photographers who have experience with North Korea or the diaspora who wish to contribute are welcome to contact me,” says Kawamura. She wishes to raise awareness about the situation in North Korea, and inspire media and journalists in Norway and Scandinavia to look into the situation of North Koreans in exile.

Giving a voice 

Kawamura arranged a similar seminar at the “Literature House” last fall with support from Norwegian Pen and publishing house Cappelen Damm. Among the participants were two survivors from a North Korean prison camp, including Mr. Shin Dong-hyuk.

This seminar is just one part of the work Kawamura is doing in order to increase attention toward North Korea, and to help and support refugees who live in Europe. She is also working on a long-term program called “Voice of Free North Korea,” which will provide a voice to some 1,000 North Koreans who live in European exile.  The main platform will be a website format, but creating a radio format is on the wish list. The goal is to give the North Korean refugees a safe platform where they can share their stories and experiences and gain new skills through training in online communication and narratives.

“We will emphasize the importance of having women on board, as they have a tendency to remain invisible. We have a gender equality perspective on our work,” says Kawamura.

Mentorship 

Kawamura believes that a mentoring program, where experienced journalists are responsible for the training, can catalyze future careers in professional media for refugees.

“It is important that we have experienced journalists with professional ethics to work with the North Korean diaspora. Part of my ambition is to lead them toward world-class journalism,” says Kawamura.

She feels it is especially important that Norway contributes to this work, and points out the country's reputation as a promoter for human rights, gender equality and support to dissident voices such as “Democratic Voice of Burma”, “The Norwegian Tibet Committee”, and “The Helsingfors Committee” and “The Human Rights House”.

Categories:

April 23, 2013

Sino-American Relations: Amour or Les Miserables?

Woodrow Wilson Center
April 18, 2013
Winston Lord

Click here to watch the webcast for Ambassador Lord's address.

Each of us will dearly hold onto our own vision and version of Nancy. I see
her to my right at a dinner one month before she left us: Leaning in with her
views. Reaching out for mine. Standing tall in her wheelchair. To her right,
quietly solicitous, sat her partner on an inspiring journey, who lifted her up down
the long homestretch.

While I am deeply honored to be chosen for this first memorial lecture, I
could not help but wonder what Nancy would say on today’s topic. Just nine days
before our loss, she wrote her vision and version: “New leadership
notwithstanding, the US-China relationship will remain uneasy, complicated and
unpredictable. Americans need to abandon their hopes for hidden reforms and
jettison the idea of an emergent, reform-oriented superhero and get on with the
hard job of working with the real Chinese.”

To the very end, Nancy Tucker was doubly clear-eyed.

In reading her words I sighed in agreement and relief. Of course, I need not
have worried. When Nancy disagreed, she was sharp in shredding sophistry, not
egos. Her mandarin name, Tong Naixin, means “Patience.” Our friend was a
mentor . . . not a tormentor.

China, with its phenomenal growth and lurking liabilities, velocity,
volatility, and its sheer scale, befuddles and bamboozles. No wonder a so-called
“China expert” is an oxymoron, if not a moron. As for me, I have reason to be
humble about my expertise.

When visiting a temple outside of Beijing, Bette and I saw the head priest
appear out of nowhere.

How his old eyes lit up when he learned that I was the envoy plenipotentiary
from the United States and she was a genuine author. Bowing most politely, he
asked if we would be so kind as to inscribe a few words to guide and instruct future
visitors.

Our egos soared to the heavens. This was an honor traditionally reserved
for emperors and illustrious scholars.

Immediately Bette began rhyming couplets in her head. Immediately I
began conjuring Kissingerian bromides in mine.

In no time an acolyte came bearing brush and ink and two beautiful wooden
tablets.

The head priest asked if we'd mind writing in English. Bowing most
politely, we eagerly agreed.

Then forthwith the priest said, "To guide and instruct our future visitors --
will you kindly write on the first tablet the word, "LADIES," and on the second
tablet the word, "GENTLEMEN."

Ladies and Gentlemen, to guide and instruct you, I hacked into the temples
of government. Since my technological skills peak at one finger pecking on my
first generation I pad, it is clear that Beijing and Washington need to beef up their
cyber defenses.

Let me leak the secret summaries of recent meetings of the Standing
Committee of the Politburo and the National Security Council.

Relations with America: The Long March

Decades will pass before even our China is once again the Middle Kingdom.
Meanwhile, we must paint simultaneously with two brushes to both assert our
interests and avoid clashes with the stronger superpower.

The United States does not necessarily wish us well. We will never be
allies, but we need not be enemies. We will often face off when interests diverge,
but we can be selective partners when interests overlap. A mix of cooperation,
competition and confrontation.

Clearly our relationship has a ceiling. From our very core to far-flung zones,
the Americans exert pressure. They threaten our political system by promoting
democracy and human rights. They mock our territorial integrity by arming
Taiwan, meddling in Hong Kong, and bowing to the Dalai Lama. They crowd our
borders with provocative patrols.

They challenge our spheres of influence by inciting neighbors to contest our
playing field. ASEAN was first to assert seabed rights. Japan bought our islands.
We had to respond to preserve our legal positions. Yet the Americans acted like
their football referees – they flagged the responders, not the instigators. They seek
to contain us with their so-called pivot and its military deployments, bases, and
drills. While whining about cyber warfare, they launch their own relentless
attacks. And they blunt our global reach through sponsorship of their international
law, ranging from sanctions to Western concepts of human rights.

Clearly our relationship also has a floor. The United States is far away, and
we do not dispute territory. Neither of us wishes military conflict with all its risks
and costs and distractions. Both of us have huge domestic challenges – we to
become a true superpower, America to stave off decline. Our hands are full with
income disparities, migration, corruption, pollution, aging and unrest fanned by
bloggers. We must strengthen the Party – fewer caravans, shark fins, Rolexes and
mistresses -- but not copy Gorbachev’s fatal Western reforms. We need a
prolonged period of relative calm abroad to focus on our agenda at home.

Besides, there are major areas of cooperation and common concern with
Washington. The mutually assured disbursement of our economies and the
stability ofthe global system. The curse of terrorism and spread of nuclear
weapons. Safe shipping lanes and piracy. Climate change and clean energy.
Health, food safety, drugs and crime.

Clearly our foreign policy should reflect our swift ascension. In Secretary
Xi’s words, we seek to institute “the Great Renaissance of the Chinese Nation.”
For three decades Deng’s dictum -- to mask our rising power and comfort the
world as we bided our time --reigned. Now we flex our musclesin the East and
South China Seas for reasons of sovereignty, security, and resources. Displays of
nationalism, especially with Japan, are effective diversions from the five hundred
eruptions every day in our villages, highways, streets and squares.

But we must not overplay our hand, and feed a Washington-led coalition.
Trying to drive the Americans from the Asia-Pacific region is foolhardy. They
have some legitimate interests, and other nations beckon them to offset our
mounting strength. Deng’s central tenet remains valid – we must give top priority
to building our country.

Thus we must cool the hotheads in the PLA, think tanks and blogosphere
who yearn for more robust contention with a waning America, underrating its
steadfast powers. Overly aggressive actions would subject us to severe backlash
and forfeit useful cooperation.

So we will be firm on issues of principle and overriding national interests.
For our own sake, not as a favor to Washington, we will selectively pitch in on
regional and global tasks. Meanwhile we will join others like Russia to dilute
American swagger and sway.

In the longer term, when we have closed the gap, our course can veer toward
more cooperation or more confrontation. It will depend on American attitudes and
actions.

Relations with China: Great Walls and Open Doors

We face both obstacles and opportunities with China. Our strategy mirrors
that of previous Republican and Democratic administrations – competitive
coexistence. We should manage our differences, expand our cooperation, and
work to integrate China in the world system as a responsible stakeholder.

The People’s Republic of China does not necessarily wish us well. We will
never be allies, but we need not be enemies. We will undergo the inevitable strains
between an established and a challenging power. With firmness and patience, with
the aid of others, we should coax Beijing to value the constancy of the international
order and engage in solving its challenges.

Meanwhile we insure against a more menacing future, cementing our
alliances and forging bonds with China’s neighbors.

Clearly our relationship has a ceiling. We peer across a chasm in political
values – their crushing of dissent, draconian censorship, suppression of ethnic and
religious minorities. Today Chinese foreign policy is more ominous and
nationalistic. Their aggressive assertion of maritime claims could ignite military
conflict. Despite official denials, Beijing seeks to reduce our influence and gain
dominance in their region. They are locking up resources in Africa and Latin
America. On many key regional and global issues they straddle or subvert. They
are mercantalistic. Their cyber attacks are robbing us blind. They bend or break
international rules, whether the WTO, human rights covenants, the Law of the Sea
or UN sanctions.

Clearly our relationship also has a floor. Both sides understand the perils
and costs of direct clashes. China, unlike the Soviet Union, does not station troops
abroad, export its ideology, or seek to undermine other regimes. We have no
territorial quarrels. We derive enormous benefits from our economic
interdependence and bilateral exchanges. On several international issues we act in
parallel.

Thus we should continue to reject the apostles of enmity. No way can or
should we keep China down. Other nations would balk, spurning the choice
between Chinese economic sustenance and the American security blanket.
Containment would drain our assets. Containment would scuttle Chinese help on
shared goals.

Moreover, time is on America’s side. Once free fromour current gridlock,
we can reinforce our advantages: per capita income, military power, strong
alliances, two oceans and friendly countries as neighbors, technological prowess,
energy production, higher education, demography, and a political system that
prompts innovation and provides for justice as well as stability.

In the longer term, we can live with a rising China. While our relative
power will decline, our absolute power will not. Our policy can veer toward more
cooperation or more confrontation, depending on Chinese attitudes and actions.

These secret papers illustrate the big picture. They provide previews of
coming attractions. Sino-American relations will surely not be Amorous or as easy
as Pi. But here’s the Silver Lining . . . they need not be Miserable or a Dark Zero
sum game.

Hills and valleysscore the landscape of past and future dealings. In our long
journey we should not succumb to either euphoria or despair. Recall that noted
music critic Mark Twain. When assessing the grandiose operas of Richard Wagner
he said that the music is “not as bad as it sounds.” And when judging the music of
Britney Spears, he opined that it is “not as good as it looks.”

In short, the fixed menu for our relations is sweet and sour, replete with
distinctive historical ingredients. China is not so much rising asreturning. For
millennia it was the Middle Kingdom, the most powerful nation on the planet.
Distant countries were irrelevant, neighbors were tributaries. From one AD to the
nineteenth century China’s share of the global GDP ranged from 22% to 33%.
Then China suffered a century of foreign humiliation from the Opium War to the
Japanese invasion, and by 1950 it accounted for less than 5% of global GDP.

Hence only in recent decades has China met the world as equals. Its
admirable ascent is the most rapid and sweeping ever recorded, but it retains a
volatile mix of arrogance and insecurity, envy and xenophobia. Its old grudges are
both real and convenient. Its own recent past of havoc, famine and massacre is
airbrushed. Its future ambitions are both audacious and veiled.

Not surprisingly, two basic clusters with multiple voices now debate China’s
foreign policy. One camp continues to endorse Deng’s mandate to focus on
domestic challenges, refrain from overseas bravado and project a calibrated
“peaceful rise.” Adherents hail the remarkable inroads of this brand since the June
1989 Tiananmen massacre, in contrast to the blowback against China’s recent
muscular stance. In the other camp, the military, think tanks, and nationalistic
blogs clamorfor China to stand up and start supplanting the world’s fading, hostile
hegemon. They suspect Washington’s motives and savor a shifting balance of
power.

As the Politburo paper indicates, Chinese policy is modulated, realistic about
American strength, but increasingly pugnacious on its core interests.

On the American side, too, historical attitudes deepen the complexity of our
ties. Americans have pictured the Chinese as both the evil Fu Manchu and the
noble peasant of Pearl Buck. Just since the 1940’s, they have been allies against
Japan; enemies in Korea; yellow hordes, blue ants and red guards; teammates
against the Polar Bear; born again capitalists; the butchers of Tiananmen Square;
potential partners on global challenges; and the menacing new superpower.

Today there are two extreme camps in the American debate: the apocalyptic
and the apologetic.

One sees China as a dragon to slay. Facing its growing economic and
military power, its unsavory political system and fierce nationalism we are at the
dawn of a global struggle with a neo Soviet Union. China is a looming enemy to
be curbed.

The other camp sees China as a panda to hug. Beijing has written the book
on rapid development. Its fear of chaos is valid. Bilateral tensions can usually be
laid at America’s door. China is a looming comrade to be indulged.

The dragon-slayers magnify Chinese strengths, overlook their vulnerabilities
and fail to understand that Beijing, for the foreseeable future, is too consumed by
its domestic travails to mount extensive foreign adventures. The policies of these
ideologues and avid military budgeteers would render Chinese hostility a self fulfilling prophecy.

The panda-huggers disregard the darker features of the Chinese landscape.
Contract-hungry entrepreneurs, visa-anxious academics, fawning former
government officials tiptoe around Beijing’s domestic suppression and shrug off its
mercantilism, military surge and shielding of rogue regimes. Their approach
would betray American values, sabotage our interests, and lose Congressional and
public support.

These tendencies have graduated shadings, of course, and number both
Democrats and Republicans. Fortunately the bipartisan center of gravity rests with
those who anchor a balanced approach. Eight successive Presidents, from Nixon
to Obama, have pursued essentially the same course of seeking positive relations
without illusions, searching for cooperation without rolling over.

Against this backdrop how should we shape our future posture? There are
no sure bets or simple formulas. Once again I needed help. It came recently on a
mountain top, where I discovered a stone tablet with engraved policy prescriptions,
aptly entitled Lord’s Ten Commitments. Let me pronounce them.

First, thou shalt not demonize China.

It seeks to spread its authority but not topple governments. While it presses
nearby claims, it does not threaten American territory. It is a competitor,
sometimes unfair, but it is not a conqueror. We gain from our economic links, our
joint projects, our burgeoning exchanges of tourists and students. We cooperate on
many international issues.

Second, thou shalt not sanitize China.

Its suppression of freedom is brutal, becoming even more so in certain
spheres. On balance, Beijing is a free rider, and derider, of the global system.
White-washing China undercuts both its domestic reformers and the world’s
governance.

Third, thou shalt not inflate China.

As the Chinese pilot announced to his passengers: “The good news is that
we are way ahead of schedule. The bad news is that we are lost.” The Chinese
deserve ovations for awesome advances. But Zhongnanhai knows better than
outsiders the mountains they must climb. Winning the race for total GDP is not
taxing when the baton is passed among 1.4 billion runners. Meanwhile for a
distinct minority, the gap widens and widens. China assembles I-phones; it does
not invent them. Corruption infests daily life, from birth to death. Chinese may
grow old before they grow rich. Go to any major city and the changes will take
your breath away … and that, of course is the rub.

There is consensus among the leadership that the 1978 blueprints for
economic reformno longer apply. Another transformation is critical. China needs
greater consumption, safety nets, innovation, level playing fields, cleaner lands and
cleaner hands. But are there enough heroes and helmsmen to overcome entrenched
interests, nepotism, self-dealing, stacked decks, and the perpetual lusting for petty
favors and access to Party power?

While China’s swelling military budgets pose some distinct threats, its
overall powerlags ours by decades. It is flanked by fourteen neighbors – the most
in the world – an unsettling medley of habitual enmity, instability, terrorism, large
militaries and nuclear weapons. In Tibet and Xinjiang, forty percent of the land,
reside restless souls. Its few real friends include North Korea and Syria.

No matter how many billions are lavished on Olympics, opera houses,
Confucius Institutes and overseas media, China’s soft power remains an
oxymoron.

If Beijing does not enact fundamental economic and political reforms in the
next decade, its pilots could well be lost and losing altitude.

Fourth, thou shalt not contain China.

This is impossible. It would guarantee hostility, lose cooperation, divide the
world and squander our resources. China is a great nation and culture. It should
be treated with respect. It deserves more seats at international tables. Its return to
power should be welcomed, not resisted or feared. As a policy option,
containment is a nightmare.

Fifth, thou shalt not coddle China.

Striving for positive relations requires sticks and spinach as well as carrots.
Beijing exploits weakness. It respects strength. When China violates trade rules,
we should take it to court or retaliate. When it refuses visas for journalists or jams
radios, we should reciprocate. When it hacks our computers we should impose
sanctions. And when it snags American businessmen, artists, academics, they
should stand up. Coddling China makes for a more dangerous world.

Sixth, thou shalt nurture mutual confidence.

Distrust haunts our engagement. Washington professes to welcome China’s
rise while Beijing professes to welcome America’s role in Asia. Neither
governments nor publics are converted.

True, Americans have ample ground for wariness. But so do the Chinese.

Presidents Obama and Xi have talked but not met since reelection and
selection. With no more campaigns for the President and an assured five to ten
years for the Secretary, the political slate is clean. They should shed their
entourages and scripts to huddle on strategic directions at Camp David, in summits
and regional conclaves. Full mutual trust is a pipe dream. But such explorations
would frame our multiple dialogues on economic, political and military topics to
avoid miscalculation, handle differences and cultivate partnership. Over time,
issue by issue cooperation can sow predictability and credence.

The most urgent area is military. While neither side seeks conflict, we could
lurch into one by mishap. We need more precise rules of the road. Our ships and
planes track and stalk each other. Treaty ties could suck us into Pacific sinkholes.
Cyber-attacks could launch a rippling calamity. Each of us is uncertain about the
other’s nuclear and space doctrines.

Recently we have seen some tentative progress on this list. Our militaries
are already mapping cooperation on easier issues such as piracy and joint
exercises. We can build on our mutual interests in secure shipping lanes, natural
disasters and protection of citizens overseas.

Seventh, thou shalt seek common ground.

The guiding principle, as always, is national self-interest.

While economic problems abound, some promising trends exist. Beijing
seeks to spend more at home. Labor costs rise. The yuan appreciates. Financial
controls should lessen. As China invents more, it should at last protect intellectual
properties.

We, in turn, seek to spend less and invest more. In the Chinese market let us
focus on competitive sectors like services. Let us press for a bilateral investment
treaty. While heeding transparency and security, let us relax export controls and
welcome their ventures in America.

Such give and take would shrink our trade deficit and create jobs.

The most dangerous threat of war comes from North Korea, led by the
Supreme Thrower of Tantrums, the Dear Leader of Starvation, the Great Leader of
Gulags. For two decades China, with some exceptions, has been more part of the
problem than the solution. Its anxieties about stability and a unified, democratic
Korea on its border trump its growing frustrations with the Kims. Whenever the
North is pressured, Beijing discards sanctions and continues to fuel, feed and
finance it. Whenever Pyongyang provokes a crisis, Beijing fatuously calls for
restraint by all parties.

Some Chinese think tanks and media now challenge this policy. Perhaps the
leaders are reviewing it. They must weigh their traditional preoccupations against
the growing risks of conflict, the extensive build up of American and allied
military assets in the region, nascent nuclear appetites in Tokyo and Seoul, the
drains on the Chinese economy and world repute.

Together with our allies, we must highlight the recklessness of its Korean
portfolio. Neither current allied policy nor increased pressure nor top level
negotiations can have legs when China drags its feet. If we could engage a
reluctant Beijing in frank discussions on Peninsula contingencies and explore
redlines on reunification, troop movements, loose nuclear weapons and refugees,
we might allay Chinese concerns and induce teamwork.

This is an urgent topic for Obama and Xi. After our repeated entreaties, will
China finally alterits policy? I fear a comic strip ending -- Lucy will keep yanking
away the football.

And make no mistake about it: if war breaks out, while the Kim Regime
will be the culprit, blood will stain the enabling Chinese hands.

Whatever happens on the North Korean external threat, shame on the world
if it once again shuts its eyes to an unfolding holocaust.

China is a party to negotiations with Iran, fearing alienation of Sunni
regimes and spikesin energy prices due to a Persian Gulf crisis. We should keep
encouraging alternative oil to compensate for Iran while leaning on Beijing to
crack down on its companies that evade sanctions.

Regarding the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa we find common
cause, if not always tactics, in countering Islamic radicalism. Beijing has been
generally supportive in Afghanistan. But on Syria, it hides behind Moscow to veto 1
intervention as in Libya. The stirrings of the Arab Spring sparked Chinese
paranoia and tighter repression.

China confronts the most severe environmental crisis in history. Pollution
inflicts compounding mayhem on the economy, health and quality of life as well as
begetting comedic bloggers: “We are reaching a state of nirvana. In Beijing you
open windows and get free cigarettes. In Shanghai you open water taps and get
free pork soup.” Recently the leadership has finally realized that pollution
threatens its precious economic growth and political stability. The Chinese have
strong incentives to join us in producing cleaner energy and grappling with climate
change.

A grand Sino-American bargain could lift our entire bilateral relationship
and kick-start genuine global progress.

On some issues we already cooperate – drugs, crime, health, food safety, and
UN peacekeeping. On others Beijing’s approach will not ease until it reckons the
costs. Most glaring is its screening of depraved regimes, impelled by greed and the
fear that international pressures on others will set precedents for China.

On this vast agenda, let us set priorities: North Korea, maritime rules, cyber
warfare, the environment.

Eighth, thou shalt shape a Pacific Community.

The most important strategic thrust of Obama’s first term was to elevate
Asia in our foreign policy. Misperceptions persist. It is not a pivot away from
Europe. It did not begin in 2010, but in January 2009. It is not primarily military,
but a mix of economics, diplomacy and just plain old showing up. It is not
designed to contain China, but to embrace the entire dynamic region.

Given these misperceptions we need to convey to Beijing in word and deed
that ample room exists for both of us, that together we should build a Pacific
community of peace and prosperity.

This quest is made somewhat easier by the current situation in Taiwan, often
a flashpoint. Thanks to enlightened policies in Taipei, Beijing and Washington,
Cross-Strait conditions are the most stable in six decades. The consensus is to
keep the status quo of no unification, no independence, and no use of force. Why 2
change the US policy so successfully pursued by Democratic and Republican
Administrations? Why fix what is not broken?

Ninth, thou shalt encourage freedom.

Even the most severe critics of China’s political system admit some great
leaps forward from the horrors of the Mao era. Today Chinese enjoy the freedom
of silence. They also can carp privately about their plights, and some petitioners
and media manage to press bureaucrats and boundaries on tolerable topics. They
can compete for college, choose their jobs, travel the nation and spend more money
abroad than any other people.

Thanks to technology there is more wiggle room in sensitive domains.
Ubiquitous cell phones and crafty computers often outwit the army of censors and
surveillance whose budget exceeds that of the PLA.

With such ways and means and the steady growth in creature comforts, it is
not surprising that many Chinese bask in contentment.

Yet, as always, contradictions bloom. In the world’s largest Communist
country the middle class so far is co-opted, while it is the peasants and workers
who protest.

On human dignity, China is ruled not by law but by a cruelty thatsecretes
the fates of massacred youth; presumes guilt, not innocence, in the Party-run
courts; confines, rather than celebrates, Nobel Prize winners, world class artists,
blind whistleblowers and their kin; impounds citizens without charge or notice;
kills female babies; drives monks and nuns to robe themselves in flames.

This issue must be on our agenda. Promoting freedom and human rights
reflects our values and international standards. It marshals Congressional and
public support for overall policy. It heartens Chinese reformers. It serves our
direct national interests because democracies do not war with each other, foster
terrorism, cover up disasters, or spawn refugees.

Even so, this subject cannot dominate a relationship brimming with security,
diplomatic and economic imperatives. Only the Chinese themselves can erect a
more open, humane and liberal political system. Thus we must, as always, appeal
to Beijing’sself-interest: Without the rule of law, free media, a thriving civil
society and accountable officials, the future will be stormy. The economy will 3
distort and inhibit. Corruption will wax, schools crumble, miners suffocate, trains
crash, babies sicken and pigs float. The people will take to the streets. Taiwan
will keep its distance. The United States will hedge. China will not earn global
respect or realize its dreams.

Is this sound analysis or merely a balmy projection of democracy’s virtues?
Can Beijing continue to defy history?

Increasingly some Chinese scholars and netizens champion political reform.
Certain leaders pay lip service to the objective, but it must stay strictly within the
Party.

I do believe a more open society will emerge, impelled by universal
aspirations, self-interest, a rising middle class, the return of students, and social
media. No one can predict the pace or the contours of the process. We might as
well consult fortune cookies.

Finally, thou shalt get thine own house in order.

The last shall be first: this is the most vital commitment for all our foreign
policy. Boosting growth, slashing debt, reforming immigration, investing in the
future are keys to American credibility and competitiveness. How can we promote
our political principles abroad when we malign them at home? It is harder to
criticize the Chinese model when Beijing builds airports faster than the Big Apple
plugs potholes.

I am, of course, not drawing direct parallels between our systems. There
you have the fleecing of liberty. Here you have the failure of nerve. There the
police are hooligans. Here the politicians are holograms. The world, including the
children and cash of Chinese Princelings, wants to come to America.

But craven legislators and manic media, pandering and polarizing shackle
our nation. Let us hope that our leaders will soon cross aisles not swords, the
media will instruct not inflame, and Americans will once more embark on bold and
common enterprises.

Given our current political impasse, economic angst and mood of
melancholy, optimists are rare. But our assets remain unrivaled, and across this
nation coalitions, ignoring the Washington debacle, explore new frontiers and
sculpt an American renaissance.

From de Tocqueville to Lee Kuan Yew foreign observers have marveled at
our ability to overcome trials, fix faults, revive the body politic and refresh
America’s soul.

For we have seen this drama before. Sputnik and the missile gap. Vietnam,
assassinations, riots and Watergate. Hostages, energy crisis and malaise. Japan
number one, Rockefeller Center and Pebble Beach. Crumbling towers.

I recall the late sixties as if it were yesterday. This country was in the most
dire straits, whiplashed by domestic turmoil, mired in a foreign quagmire, and
wrestling with a nuclear superpower. America, as always, rebounded. Out of
trials we derive strength. Now our uniquely immigrant society should flourish in a
shrunken world, its fabric much sturdier thanks to movement on the bus and
shattered ceilings and the new look of schoolrooms, barracks, stadiums, studios,
rotundas, sanctums, Foggy Bottom, and the White House.

What about China? How will it look?” If Nancy Tucker were here, she
would, I believe, summon Lord Tennyson:

“Far away beyond her myriad coming changes,
China will be
Something other than the wildest modern guess
Of you and me.”

My own wildest guess – and hope – is that in our long march, as China frees
its stride and America lifts its horizons, we will scale walls and open doors.

Categories:

April 17, 2013

NTDTV: China Blames US for Tensions in the Asia Pacific

This article originally appeared on NTDTV on April 16, 2013.



It was a thinly veiled attack on the United States. China’s Defense Ministry Spokesman Yang Yujun said today (April 16) that “some countries”, were making tensions in the Asia Pacific worse. And he wasn’t talking about North Korea.

The criticism of the US comes as the Chinese regime released a defense white paper. For the first time, it spelled out the size and strength of China’s People’s Liberation Army.

Clearly unnerved by the US military’s shift to the Asia-Pacific region, China says the US has emboldened many of its neighbors, like Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The Chinese regime has been locked in sovereignty disputes with these countries, and when the smaller neighbors also rely on China for things like trade, the competing claims are a source of frustration.

With the US’s increasing presence, the Philippines in particular have been more aggressive in defending its borders. Last week it arrested several Chinese fishermen found illegally fishing in Philippine waters.

The US has also been supplying Taiwan with military hardware for years. The Chinese regime considers Taiwan a breakaway province. It has vowed to claim the island by force if necessary.

And of course, there’s North Korea. As Pyongyang turns it’s threatening gaze towards South Korea, Japan, and the United States, Yang Yujun says US military drills in the region has only made tensions worse.

As the US shifts its focus to the Asia Pacific, the Chinese regime has been boosting its military spending, and trying to modernize its naval fleets. But the regime says the build-up is only for peaceful purposes and national defense.
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April 16, 2013

On North Korea, Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick

This article was originally posted to the U.S. News World Report on April 15. 2013.

By Andrew Natsios

Andrew S. Natsios is an executive professor at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, and the author of Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know. Natsios served as administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development and as President George W. Bush's special envoy to Sudan.

Since Nassim Nicholas Taleb's best-selling book The Black Swan: the Impact of the Highly Improbable popularized the notion of the black swan event, a cottage industry has grown up of analysts attempting to anticipate the next highly improbable event that will dramatically alter the course of history. Black swan analysts have now focused their attention on a potential Second Korean War because of fears of where North Korea's increasing belligerence might end. Highly improbable and unanticipated events of extraordinary consequence have changed the course of 20th century history more than once, and could again on the Korean peninsula.

The First World War was ignited by an assassin's bullet in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 in one of the greatest black swan events of the 20th century. President John F. Kennedy's assassination made Lyndon Johnson president, who then proceeded to push civil rights legislation and the Great Society programs through Congress and send more troops to Vietnam, which Kennedy had been unable or unwilling to do.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War between Arab states and Israel, OPEC's subsequent oil embargo, and the quadrupling of oil prices caused massive shifts in the balance of world financial power we are still living with, which few predicted before the sequence of events happened. The black swan collapse of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attack on the United States brought massive changes to the international system and its structure of power.

Will a Second Korean War become the black swan event of Barak Obama's presidency, ending his focus on domestic policy and concentrating it on events in the world he has been reluctant to confront? On the face of it, the threats pouring out of Pyongyang these days are over the top, even to experienced North Korea watchers. The last old order Communist, Fidel Castro, weighed in this week by cautioning North Korea to restrain itself – warning of the dangers of a nuclear conflict to humanity.

A member of Congress leaked one sentence in a Defense Intelligence Agency estimate that reported North Korea now has the ability to attach its nuclear weapons to its existing missile technology, which if true would pose a clear and present danger to South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. military bases there and on Guam. While the White House quickly disputed the DIA analysis and claimed that North Korea did not have the capability as yet, the news of dispute within the intelligence community further increased tension levels.

North Korea is perhaps the world's most isolated and secretive society and thus we know little about the dynamics inside the government – who is actually making the decisions and who is advising the young leader, if anyone is. We do not know what is motivating their behavior: We suspect it is to get more aid from donors, to bolster the reputation of their untested young leader, or to unify the party elite during the purges going on. We theorize and we speculate, but we don't know. Making policy decisions blind can be dangerous, particularly when dealing with a country with nuclear weapons.

What we do know is that North Korea's three most senior generals have been purged and have disappeared. The day after firing one of the generals, Kim Jong Un promoted himself to be Marshall of the North Korean People's Army, which, for a 28 year old kid whose only military experience is playing video war games, is bizarre even by North Korean standards.

We know that for months now, the North Korean propaganda machine has been spewing out invective against Japan, South Korea, and the United States (nothing new there). Pyongyang abrogated the armistice agreement which ended the Korean War, placed videos on its website showing North Korean nuclear missiles raining down on the United States, and told foreign embassies to leave the country as the government could no longer guarantee their safety.

All of this could be dismissed as typical North Korean histrionics, but they also announced they were closing down a South Korean industrial park in the North from which they earn between $80 and $90 million a year in badly-needed foreign currency. What sane, rational government on the edge of economic ruin, unable to feed its own starving population, cuts a $90 million financial lifeline?

This suggests that the rational actor theory of international relations – that foreign leaders act in their own self-interest and do not behave in overtly self-destructive ways – which much of our foreign policy is predicated on may not be operative in North Korea, in which case a black swan event could well take place. (Or perhaps the regime is trying to convince us of its irrationality so it can get more concessions.)

Kim Il Song and his son Kim Jong Il, the father and grandfather of the current North Korean leader, hated, and yet also feared, the military power of the United States because of their memories of the Korean War. Kim Jong Un has no memory of the war and no fear of U.S. power. And there may be no one around him warning him of the consequences of carrying his war mania too far.

The psychology of power in any dictatorship, particularly while purges are going on, transforms even the bravest war heroes into mindless sycophants who tell their leaders what they want to hear, not what they should know. Dissent in China among party leaders during the Great Leap Famine between 1958-1962 is most instructive on this – even the great reformer Deng Xiaoping told Mao what he wanted to hear and not what he should know, which was that the famine caused by his policies was killing tens of millions. If Kim Jong Un is making the decisions and taking advice from the sycophants he surrounds himself with, he may not know his limits.

The best Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang can do under the circumstances is to prepare for the worst and hope for the best. The allies should, of course, speak and act as one to make clear to Pyongyang that it cannot divide the alliance. North Korea is a mendicant state which behaves instead like a major power; its greatest weaknesses are brutality towards it own people, it inability to feed them, and its collapsed economy.

For two decades the allies purchased temporary peace on the Korean peninsula by giving tribute in the form of aid to the North, while Pyongyang has spent the time building its nuclear arsenal and missile systems instead of shutting them down (which we naively believed it would do). The policy of buying temporary peace with aid did not work then and will not work now; it should not be tried again. But aggressive allied rhetoric in response to North Korean threats should be avoided because it plays into Pyongyang's efforts to create a war hysteria.

Theodore Roosevelt's principle of speaking softly and carrying a big stick remains the best strategy. The problem with the strategy, though, is that the U.S. stick is being destroyed with the DOD budget cuts now underway, sending a dangerous signal to North Korea (and others) that the US is stepping down from its preeminent position of military power; restoring the cuts would send the right message. Without public comment, the U.S. Pacific fleet should be ordered into place, joint forces should be on alert, and the most advanced weapons systems should be sent to the region so that if the North attacks any one of the three allies, massive retaliation can be immediate and overwhelming.

U.S. diplomatic efforts now underway to get the Chinese to restrain Pyongyang make sense, but should not be the center of U.S. policy because this approach has not worked in the past – we may have exaggerated Chinese leverage over the North. North Korea cannot sustain a prolonged war effort: it does not have the fuel for its  aging weapons systems, the spare parts to repair them, or the food reserves to feed its army. Time would not be on its side. It may be that a black swan event cannot be prevented, but we may be able to limit its consequences.
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April 11, 2013

Statement on the UN Commission of Inquiry on North Korean Human Rights

By Roberta Cohen, HRNK Co-Chair and Non-Resident Senior Fellow, the Brookings Institution

Presented at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, April 2, 2013

North Korea is best known internationally for its nuclear weapons tests, rocket launches and provocative threats, and also for the chronic hunger and malnutrition of most of its population. Less publicized have been its widespread, systematic and grave human rights violations. But on March 21, the United Nations Human Rights Council, a 47 member body, took an important step. It established a commission of inquiry into North Korea’s human rights violations to determine the extent to which they amount to crimes against humanity and with a view to promoting accountability. As you know, crimes against humanity defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court are among the most serious human rights violations, comprising murder, enslavement, unlawful imprisonment, torture, persecution, sexual violence and enforced disappearances -- when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population. The commission of inquiry specifically will look into violations associated with North Korea’s penal labor camps (in which 150,000 to 200,000 political prisoners are incarcerated), North Korea’s abductions of thousands of foreigners, its denial of free movement – most North Koreans cannot get permission to leave their country, its discrimination on political and religious grounds, and the denial of the right to food -- North Korea’s military first policy and its relationship to mass starvation. The commission will be composed of three independent experts and will cooperate with UN agencies and experts, interested institutions, regional intergovernmental bodies and NGOs. Its work will take place over the period of one year.

What is the significance of the setting up of a commission of inquiry? It is recognition by the international community that there is a human rights emergency in North Korea. Generally, the UN sets up commissions of inquiry for situations where conflicts, atrocities and destruction are clearly visible in the context of civil wars like in Syria or Darfur. The establishment of a commission for North Korea recognizes that there are serious crimes being committed in this largely closed off society where no human rights experts or groups are allowed in, where information is tightly controlled, surveillance pervasive, and where anyone who does visit is unable to talk with North Koreans about human rights. Indeed, the North Korean government has invested tremendous energy in trying to conceal the situation. Yet over the past decade, with satellite photographs and testimony from former prisoners who escaped, a picture has emerged of large numbers of political prisoners incarcerated in subhuman conditions in forced labor camps hidden away in mountainous areas. By exposing the situation, the UN is challenging North Korea’s efforts to hide its atrocities.

A second reason why the commission is significant is that it reflects international willingness to move beyond censure and look at North Korea’s violations as possible crimes against humanity for which North Korean leaders could be held accountable in future. Getting to this point has taken a long time. For ten years, the UN’s highest ranking UN official on human rights, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has tried to establish a dialogue with North Korea and develop technical cooperation agreements with its government. Such cooperation would include rule of law programs, educational programs or setting up a national human rights commission, arrangements which the UN has with more than 50 governments. But North Korea has regularly refused to talk with the High Commissioner or allow in the UN Rapporteur on Human Rights in North Korea, a position set up by the Human Rights Council in 2004 to investigate and report on the human rights situation. North Korea has also regularly ignored the recommendations put forward in resolutions adopted annually by the UN General Assembly and in reports of the UN Secretary-General.

Its failure to cooperate has alienated many states. When the UN General Assembly first adopted a resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation in 2005, 88 states voted for the resolution (up to 100 opposed or abstained). By 2011, the number in favor of the resolution went up to 123 and in 2012, the 193 member General Assembly adopted the resolution by consensus. The 47 member Human Rights Council which established the commission of inquiry adopted it by consensus as well. Although North Korea has complained that the commission of inquiry is a hostile Western plot, 18 African states in the Council, 13 Asian states, and 8 Latin American countries joined the European states and the United States in supporting the commission, and China and Russia, although not Council members this year, did not try to stop the commission. It should be noted as well that the UN senior officials at the forefront of the commission are not Westerners. The High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay who made a widely publicized appeal in support of the commission is a South African of Indian origin. Marzuki Darusman, the Special Rapporteur whose report to the Council made the legal case for the commission, was the former Attorney General of Indonesia. He built on the work of his predecessor, a Thai law professor Vitit Muntarbhorn.

In making an exhaustive study of North Korea’s human rights situation, the commission will face many challenges. Let’s look at a few. First is the information issue. Commission members are by all expectations not going to be allowed into North Korea which means the commission is going to have to rely mainly on information from those who have been to or have some knowledge of the country, the testimony of survivors of prison labor camps and detention facilities and satellite photos. When it comes to the testimony of survivors, it is not easy for them to give testimony – that is, to revisit a painful past. They also put themselves at risk (North Korea has designated some as enemies of the state and harass them through hacking and other serious means). Further they put at risk family members, friends and colleagues left behind. All the North Koreans who come out are haunted by what has happened to their family members, colleagues and friends because of their departure and testimony. Of the 25,000 North Koreans who have made their way to the South over the past decade, hundreds are former prisoners and former prison guards with stories to tell.

A second challenge will be developing a better approach for dealing with the human rights information coming from the survivors. For years, UN High Commissioners generally did not say very much about North Korea and explained that North Korea’s closed door policy barred the UN from forming its own independent diagnosis of the human rights situation. In other words, a direct assessment was needed to establish credibility. Even the State Department’s human rights report in 2012 came with caveats that no one can assess fully human rights conditions and that the testimony of defectors can be dated. Instructive is what NGOs have done. They may not have had access to the country or the camps but the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, for example, published an in depth report on the camps, Hidden Gulag, written by David Hawk in 2003 and updated in 2012, which published the testimony of 60 former prisoners and prison guards and the author was very careful in interviewing survivors and using their information. Many of their accounts, the report shows, corroborate the testimony of others so that they can be seen as factual. And satellite photos further provide verification of the camps. The book Escape from Camp 14, which came out in 2012, gives the hair raising account of a survivor who was born in the camps and miraculously escaped. For the very first time, in December 2012 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights met with camp survivors – two of them – and was reportedly quite affected. Not long after that meeting, she issued her first really strong statement on North Korea, underscoring what she learned from the two survivors and calling for a commission of inquiry. Perhaps the High Commissioner’s Office began to realize that its constantly drawing attention to the lack of verifiable information on North Korea could have the unintended effect of lending support to North Korea’s claims that the human rights abuses reported are based on “unfounded information” emanating from those who had betrayed their country.

North Korea has felt threatened by survivors’ testimony and has been trying to reduce the number of North Koreans telling their stories. It has been cracking down intensely at its border with China (with shoot to kill orders, extensive new barbed wire and increased surveillance) in order to prevent North Koreans’ departure for the South. 1,509 North Koreans reached South Korea in 2012, only about half the number that managed to escape the year before. But North Koreans continue to come out and wield the only weapon they have against the regime -- information.

Still another challenge for the commission will be to elicit information from humanitarian and development organizations which have field presence, albeit limited, in North Korea and may have some information. They may be averse to cooperate openly with the commission for fear of being expelled. Yet the food issue will be part of the commission’s work. I would note that the starvation rations for prisoners make them among “the most vulnerable” in the population. And the most vulnerable are the people humanitarian agencies are supposed to monitor and try to reach.  

The commission, I believe, should be part of an overall UN strategy to promote human rights in North Korea. The strategy should be developed and led by the Secretary-General and High Commissioner for Human Rights. It should have definite goals like achieving a dialogue with North Korea, disseminating to its schools, government offices and institutions Korean translations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international access to the penal labor camps, an end to the prison system and forced labor, and allowing freedom of movement for North Koreans across borders. A UN strategy to be effective should bring together the myriad of UN offices and agencies involved with North Korea, including UNHCR, UNDP, the ILO, UNESCO, the World Food Program and others so that the entire system can be tapped and work together to seek to improve human rights in North Korea.

Governments, although not mentioned in the UN resolution, also should be expected to provide information to the commission, sometimes on a confidential basis, including satellite information and their interpretations of it which is currently not available.

In closing, let me draw attention to a final challenge – and that is, what happens if the commission determines crimes against humanity. How can North Korean leaders be held accountable? North Korea has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court so the Court does not have jurisdiction in the case of North Korea. Of course the Security Council can refer the case of North Korea to the Court, but China or Russia are on the Council and can be expected to veto such a referral (although China did not challenge the setting up of the commission of inquiry). There are other options as well, such as setting up an independent tribunal for North Korea (independent tribunals exist for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) but again the Security Council would probably have to authorize the tribunal. Or there’s the option of having the UN General Assembly refuse North Korea’s credentials – this was done once in the case of South Africa’s apartheid system. Let me call on students and faculty at the Fletcher School to look at the issue of accountability and come up with ideas. Recall that the idea for a commission of inquiry first arose in 2006 with a report of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea. No one thought the commission could happen, but it did. You may come up with ideas that will contribute to international thinking on this issue.

Thank you.


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April 08, 2013

The North Korean Nuclear Test of February 2013

Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Angelo State University and the current President of the International Council on Korean Studies. His latest book, The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era (Washington DC: Potomac Books) is scheduled for publication in April 2013.

The following is an excerpt from the author' upcoming book, entitled,
The Last Days of Kim Jong-il: The North Korean Threat in a Changing Era (Washington DC: Potomac Books). Scheduled for publication April, 2013.

North Korea conducted its third nuclear test during February of 2013.  Most estimates placed the explosive power of the test as being significantly higher than either of the first two tests.  In fact, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense placed that the estimated yield of the device tested was six to nine kilotons.  Intelligence agencies from the United States, South Korea, and Japan had numerous sophisticated collection means deployed during the test, but were unable to definitively determine if it was a Plutonium or Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) device.  While there was no proof that the test was either Plutonium or HEU, there were many factors that suggested it was an HEU test (as I will address next) - though the North Koreans took measures to ensure that it was contained (likely so intelligence agencies could not collect data).1

Of interest, and directly related to whether or not North Korea's third nuclear test was Plutonium or HEU, Iranians were present at the test.  Iran is not known to have a Plutonium weaponization program, and thus would likely have no reason to attend the test unless it was to help with their HEU weaponization program.  The Iranians reportedly asked Pyongyang if they could send observers to monitor the test in November of 2012.  The Iranians also reportedly paid the North Koreans tens of millions of dollars to observe the test.  The request came from the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization and was approved by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.  The payment is said to have been made through the Bank of Kunlun in Beijing.  Of note, among the Iranians said to have been in attendance at the nuclear test was the man known as the "father of the Iranian nuclear program," Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi - who is said to be the head of Iran's collaboration effort with North Korea to develop a nuclear warhead for a missile.  Some analysts believe the weapon tested during February of 2013 was a miniaturized warhead for a missile.2

More evidence pointing to the February 2013 test being an HEU device comes from the North Koreans.  They claimed in public statements that the test was to develop a "smaller and light" warhead.  In fact, North Korea's news service announced that they had used a "miniaturized and lighter nuclear device with greater explosive force than previously."3   The importance of a miniaturized warhead cannot be overstated.  The ability to mount an HEU warhead (if in fact that is what was tested in February of 2013) on a missile is a true "game changer."  North Korea has around 100 (or more) transporter-erector-launcher mobile ballistic missile platforms.  According to an unnamed official in the South Korean government, there are 27-40 Scud missile launchers, 27-40 No Dong missile launchers, and 14 launchers for the Musudan missile.4   Of course, other launchers also likely exist for developing systems.  While sanctions were called for by the UN, there is no doubt that North Korea - a nation-state that has sophisticated tactics and techniques for getting around sanctions - will continue to proliferate their nuclear technology to nations like Iran, as the profits from this endeavor put cash in the pockets of the elite and help to support the military.5  Based on reports that Iranian experts observed the nuclear test, that the North Koreans announced it was a test of a miniaturized device, and the great care that the North Koreans took not to let particles escape from the test, my assessment is that this test was of an HEU weapon - most likely a warhead that could be mounted on a missile.  But as this was never definitively proven, the status of North Korea's HEU nuclear weaponization program remains mired in ambiguity.

Notes:
1. For analysis on North Korea's third nuclear test, and the data that is known, See: Song Sang-ho, "North Korea Conducts 3rd Nuclear Test," Korea Herald, February 12, 2013, http://nwww.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20130212000883 Choi He-suk, "Estimates Differ on Size of N.K. Blast," Korea Herald, February 14, 2013, http://my.news.yahoo.com/estimates-differ-size-n-k-blast-041003243.html For information regarding the collection of intelligence and other data during and after the nuclear test, See: Mark Hosenball, "Spy Agencies Scrounge for Details on North Korean Nuclear Test," Reuters, February 20, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/us-korea-north-nuclear-usa-idUSBRE91J1CY20130220 For analysis about North Korean efforts to contain the blast so that foreign intelligence agencies could not determine the type of weapon, See: Jung-ha Won, "Lack of Data Shrouds Nature of N. Korea Nuclear Test," AFP, February 14, 2013, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gj_QgeYYUBzIqCWhzpOHLJ7ESrLQ?docId=CNG.464e2be3b8023ccfe02bede099a1bdce.351
2. For information on Iranians present at the nuclear test, the payments made to North Korea for the right to attend the test, and analysis suggesting that the test was of a miniaturized warhead, See: "Report, Iranians at N. Korea Nuclear Test," UPI, February 15, 2013, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/02/15/Report-Iranians-at-N-Korea-nuclear-test/UPI-22931360904909/ "Fears Rise About Iran-North Korea Nuclear Connection," NKNews, February 18, 2013, http://www.nknews.org/2013/02/fears-rise-about-iran-north-korea-nuclear-connection/ "Iran paid Millions for Ringside Seat at N. Korean Nuke Test," Chosun Ilbo, February 18, 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/18/2013021801176.html "Iranian Nuclear Chief Observed Korean Nuke Test," Jerusalem Post, February 17, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=303499 Lee Sang-yong, "Evidence of Iranian Test Involvement Mounts," Daily NK, February 19, 2013, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=10327 "NK Nuke was Bought and Paid for by a Key End-User: Iran," Korea Times, February 20, 2013, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/02/511_130797.html Vincent Pry, "Understanding North Korea and Iran," Missile Threat.com, February 26, 2013, http://missilethreat.com/understanding-north-korea-and-iran/
3. See: Mary Beth Nikitin, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Technical Issues," Congressional Research Service, February 12, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34256.pdf David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, "Defying U.N., North Korea Confirms Third Nuclear Test," New York Times, February 12, 2013, http://news.asiantown.net/r/28361/defying-un--north-korea-confirms-third-nuclear-test-prompting-emergency-un-meeting
4."N. Korea 'Has 100 Mobile Missile Launch Platforms,'" Chosun Ilbo, February 14, 2013, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/02/14/2013021401237.html
5.For analysis on the tactics and techniques North Korea uses to launder money and proliferate materials with a great deal of success, See: Jack Kim and Louis Charbonneau, "North Korea Uses Cash Couriers, False Names to Outwit Sanctions," Reuters, February 15, 2013, http://news.yahoo.com/north-korea-uses-cash-couriers-false-names-outwit-013200620.html

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April 02, 2013

VG: Defector claims North Korea has 3,000 hackers

Translated by Andrea Torjussen

This article originally appeared on VG Nett on March 24, 2013.
South Korean computer experts claimed that a cyberattack on the country’s banks came from China, but they now blame North Korea.

Last week, three television stations and two banks in South Korea were knocked out at the same time in what is believed to be a cyberattack.

Another target on the list was the human rights organization the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, located in the United States.

The attack knocked out 32,000 computers, and South Koreans immediately suspected their enemy in the North. However, the day after the attack security authorities announced that all traces led to computers in China. This is completely wrong, writes CNN.

“We were too fast in our conclusion, and did not double check all the facts,” said Lee Seung-won, spokesman for the South Korean communications commission, in an interview with the Associated Press (AP).

Educates computer warriors 

The cyberattack was probably launched from North Korea, but the investigation of the attack can take several weeks.  The government in Seoul has not confirmed that the cyberattack came from North Korea, after they mistakenly blamed China for the attack last week.

According to computer experts in the South Korean capital, cyber warriors are being trained and educated in Pyongyang with the aim to increase their ability to conduct sabotage.

“North Korea has nothing to lose in a cyber war, even if they are responsible for having attacked banks and media, there is no measure for retaliation from South Korea,” says Kim Seong-joo, professor of computer defense at Seoul University, to AP.

South Korea has accused its neighbor of responsibility for six major cyberattacks since 2009. They have also created a command center to be able to compete in the technological race with the North, writes AP.

In the last couple of years, North Korea has undergone rapid technological development. The country has developed its own operating system, called the “Red Star,” and launched a Chinese-produced tablet that is specially designed for the North Korean market.

Thousands of hackers 

The last supplement to the North Korean arsenal is a growing ability to use cyberattacks in warfare. “The country uses sophisticated hackers to destroy and infiltrate,” said James Thurman, Commander of the United States Forces Korea, in 2012.

In 2010, the number of professional state-employed cyber warriors was an estimated 1,000 people. North Korea’s top universities educate these people, and some are even sent to China and Russia for further education.

“Some of these cyber warriors are also stationed in China, which has been North Korea’s greatest support in recent years,” stated Kim Heung-kwang, a defector who claims to have trained hackers in the town of Hamhung, to AP.

The defector, who quotes a classified document, claims that North Korea’s previous leader Kim Jong-il gave orders in 2009 that at least 3,000 state employees should function as professional cyber warriors.

“North Korea has the capacity to send damaging software to computers, servers and networks, and implement attacks that can knock out networks completely. The targets are the United States and South Korea,” stated the defector.

The Pyongyang government has not confirmed that students are being educated as hackers, and they have not commented on the latest cyberattacks.

“China’s Hackers Headquarters”

In February it became known that several computer attacks could be traced to an ordinary building in Shanghai.

This building is believed to be the APT 1’s group headquarters. APT stands for “Advanced Persistent Threat,” and the group is accused of the attacks against important goals, such as the national network for power supply in the United States, writes the Norwegian News Agency (NTB).

“We believe that the reason why groups like APT 1 can perform such extensive and lengthy espionage over the Internet must be that they are directly sponsored by the Chinese government,” claims the security company Mandiant in a New York Times report.

The Chinese government has denied these allegations.

“China’s military has never supported hacking. Claims against China’s military that they are involved in cyberattacks are unprofessional and not in accordance with the facts,” said the Chinese Ministry of National Defense in a statement.

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